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Abstract 
For centuries, the peoples of the Korean Peninsula and the island of Japan have had a 
turbulent history; one of conflict and occupation, cultural and economic trade, and much more. 
However, many would agree that the most definable moment for current South Korean and 
Japanese relations is the Japanese Annexation and Occupation of Joseon Korea from 1910-1945.  
Japanese rule consisted of atrocities and war crimes, economic exploitation, erasure of Korean 
culture, and military sexual slavery; the victims referred to as ‘comfort women’. Japanese forced 
sexual slavery not only affected relations between the island and peninsula, but it also deeply 
affected Korean culture through means of trauma, and most recently, the search for justice.  
Cultural trauma is a relatively new concept in the social sciences and has been explored 
and expanded upon by scholar Jeffrey C. Alexander. Studies have been done to examine trauma 
in decedents of comfort women survivors and have just begun to examine the history of comfort 
women’s role in contributing to national identity. However, to what extent and in what ways  
cultural trauma continues to persist in contemporary South Korea is unknown. To fully 
understand the magnitude of such trauma is incredibly important in understanding how cultural 
trauma works, and the ways in which it will persist and affect the future whether culturally, 
politically, or economically. For this reason, I studied the cultural trauma and national identity of 
the Korean 'comfort women' of WWII narrative to find out to what extent such history resonates 
with young Korean adults and is affecting their social and political perspectives towards Japan 
and its government. This study has shown that among all participants, the narrative of the 
comfort women plays a strong role in their sense of national identity. However, the presence of 
cultural trauma was limited to female participants, demonstrating that cultural trauma can be 
gendered and should be investigated further.  
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Introduction 
For centuries, the peoples of the Korean Peninsula and the island of Japan have had a 
turbulent history; one of conflict and occupation, cultural and economic trade, and much more. 
However, many would agree that the most definable moment for current South Korean and 
Japanese relations is the Japanese Annexation and Occupation of Joseon Korea from 1910-1945.  
Japanese rule consisted of atrocities and war crimes, economic exploitation, erasure of Korean 
culture, as well as the focus of my research, military sexual slavery. In this study, I will be 
addressing the following questions: 
1. Why is cultural trauma present in young Korean adults that are not direct descendants 
of comfort women survivors? 
2. What narrative of the comfort women is being spread, and what are its underlying 
tones and implications? 
3. How has this narrative affected participants’ perspectives towards the Japanese 
government, and their sense of national identity as South Korean citizens? 
This study has shown that among all participants, the narrative of the comfort women 
plays a strong role in their sense of national identity. The current comfort women narrative meets 
all theoretical criteria for being a effective vehicle for cultural trauma. However, the presence of 
cultural trauma was limited to female participants, demonstrating that cultural trauma can be 
gendered and should be investigated further. This thesis may be of interest to South Korean and 
Japanese policymakers, comfort women activists, scholars of history and anthropology, and the 
wider public as well. The findings from this study can support those seeking justice for the 
comfort women and demonstrate that the consequences of sexual slavery in Korea were not 
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isolated and are still present among today's and future generations, even after the remaining 
comfort women survivors pass away. 
Literature Review 
As other scholars have done, I am adopting two main perspectives when studying the 
history and experience of the comfort women and their movement of support; one of feminism 
and one of intersectionality (Min, 2003). From an intersectional analysis, it is important to 
recognize that a one-sided emphasis on Japanese colonialism and gender hierarchy as the main 
factor leading to the comfort women system will "misrepresent the feminist issue and 
misinterpret the comfort women’s experiences, and cannot fully explain their suffering” (Min, p. 
938). Instead, it is an intersection of colonialism, sexism, racism, classism, and capitalist 
imperialism that will provide a holistic understanding of their true experiences (Min, 2003; Jun, 
2019; Soh, 2008). Through this understanding, one must acknowledge the rendering of the 
Korean comfort women as "other"; especially through the lens of their colonized/postcolonial 
and patriarchal society. In my research, I will be attentive to the theoretical and methodological 
criticisms concerning the marginalization and representation of the “other”. I also want to 
acknowledge my identity as a white woman from the United States, that I have grown an 
academic environment based on western epistemology, and that the history, experience, and 
solidarity of comfort women survivors is one that I will never be able to fully experience or 
understand.  
Cultural trauma, a relatively new and emerging concept in the social sciences, is well 
defined by Dr. Jeffrey C. Alexander, in his chapter of Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. It 
can be defined as a trauma that "occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been 
subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, 
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marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and 
irrevocable ways" (Alexander, 2004, p. 1). Acknowledging that every experience of trauma is 
different and though such effects have not been fully explored, their existence is a certainty.  
Such trauma can travel with a collectivity/culture through time, as narratives and attitudes are 
passed down, reconstructed, and reinterpreted. This diffusion plays a large part "in the course of 
defining national identity; national histories are constructed around injuries that cry out for 
revenge" (p. 8). The construction of such histories is incredibly important to examine; there is 
often a gap between "event and representation" (p. 11). The process of trauma storytelling "a 
complex and multivalent symbolic process that is contingent, contested, and sometimes highly 
polarizing" (p. 12).  
 Essential to my study and the wider discussion around cultural trauma is the emphasis 
and analysis of the specific ways in which such narratives are developed and shared. The pre-
existing cultural understandings and contexts held by various (racial, ethnic, class, gender, etc.) 
groups and institutions result in multiple and varied interpretations of an event (Alexander, 2007, 
p. 3). "Social resources such as power, status, and money vitally affect, but do not by themselves 
determine"  the influence of a narrative (p. 3). The most important factor in a specific 
interpretation to succeeding and becoming the dominant narrative of an event, Alexander 
highlights, is how effectively the interpretation is made and how it resonates with the broader 
collectivity. Such a process for an effective narrative and vehicle of cultural trauma includes 5 
key elements and criteria. An effective narrative, according to Alexander "begins with defining, 
symbolizing, and dramatizing what "happened", and includes the establishment of the victims' 
identities, the perpetrators' identities, and finally, proposing a solution appropriate to the 
mentioned facts. 
KOREAN “COMFORT WOMEN” Adamek 7 
In a text published only a few years later titled Remembrance of Things Past: China, the 
“Nanking Massacre” and Chinese Identity, Dr. Alexander and his colleague Rui Gao explore 
how the narrative of the Nanking Massacre was constructed, fostered, and evolved by various 
groups, using the analytical method just mentioned. Immediately following Nanking Massacre, 
Western media took immediate action and broadcasted the news of this event globally. 
Alexander and Gao explain that these publications, having been written by and interpreted by a 
Western audience, were deeply informed by the existing cultural structures in 1937 (Alexander 
and Gao, p. 5). Such structures included the dualistic, Eurocentric division between “West” 
versus “East”.  For Western observers, “the massacre was seen against the backdrop of Japan’s 
polluted rising sun, the shocking birth of an industrial japan, its early victories over China and 
Russia, its occupation of Manchuria and Korea, its militarization from the 1920s onward, all of 
which were constructed as an unprecedented, and unjustified, Eastern challenge to the West” (p. 
5). Though the empathy for the Chinese victims and the ethical outrage fueled a great deal of the 
West’s urgent coverage of the Nanking Massacre, it was the Japanese threat to Western 
hegemony that spiked the need to raise awareness and condemn this horrendous event. In the 
west, after its initial coverage and discussions over hegemony, the Nanking Massacre quickly 
faded from view.  
What was missing from the narration of the Nanking Massacre and was found in that of 
Pearl Harbor was the sense of collective identity and belonging. "When Americans themselves 
became the object of "Japanese perfidy”", the event was labeled a "day of infamy" and one that 
would live forever; "and it was, in fact, consecrated by the American people for the next fifty 
years" (p. 6). Though both the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Nanking Massacre were both 
tragedies, the death of hundreds of Americans in Hawaii "represents a mere asterisk in the 
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history of human perfidy, a blip compared to the truly horrendous massacres in Nanking that had 
occurred only slightly more than four years before" (p. 6). Alexander and Gao, through the 
comparison of how these two events were perceived in the U.S., strongly demonstrate that "it is 
collective identity that matters in the construction of trauma, and the scope of this identity 
depends on identifying with a putative trauma's victims" (p. 6). The large geographic, cultural, 
and political differences between the American and Chinese populations played a large role in 
perception.  
Alexander’s theory is not without its criticisms, which I will highlight briefly and state 
why I will continue to use his framework of cultural trauma in my investigation. Sociologist Dr. 
Brian Steensland highlights that the structure and language of the book Cultural Trauma and 
Collective Identity seems to restrict the relationship between the traumatic event itself and the 
collective trauma and identity shared thereafter. Steensland calls Alexander's framework an 
"unapologetically social constructionist orientation to argue that events, even those on the scale 
of the 9/11 attacks, are not inherently traumatic", and that instead, it is exclusively narratives and 
"cultural templates through which they are experienced render them so" (Steensland, 2005, p. 
1776). The risk that Steensland identifies with this framework is that it recategorizes and 
recharacterizes many historical tragedies, and "brackets the significance of other sources of 
subjective experience (p. 1777). Strictly following this completely non-essentialist, constructivist 
framework, events such as slavery in the United States and the Holocaust are not seen as 
traumatic for those who lived through them, seemingly delegitimizing their experiences. It is 
only after the creation of an African American identity during Reconstruction and the post-war 
narration of assault on the Jewish community that trauma was brought into existence. While this 
concern is valid, one must recognize the differentiation that Alexander is making between the 
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traumas of and after a tragic event. It is indisputable and beyond doubt that individuals 
experiencing and witnessing major crises develop trauma in deep, irreversible ways, and 
Alexander is not contesting this. Rather, from my interpretation of his work, mentions of the 
word 'trauma' almost exclusively refer to cultural trauma; the very nature of this concept calls for 
its origination to begin post-tragedy. The trauma of the events themselves provides the 
foundation for the narrative, and it is what parts of that foundation and how they are interpreted 
and relayed are the basis for cultural trauma. It is not devalued or delegitimated in the discourse 
of cultural trauma, rather such initial, event-specific trauma is different from the subject been 
explored.  
 Sociologist and Anthropologist Dr. Ben-Yehuda, in his review of the same text, 
introduces an issue with the definition of cultural trauma, in that it is a concept "so broadly 
defined that it includes too much and becomes a useless buzzword" (Ben-Yehuda, 2005, p. 
1849). Respectfully, I disagree and would say that the broadness of cultural trauma's definition is 
one of its strengths. The newness of the concept necessitates room for nuance as it is increasingly 
being applied and analyzed to events globally and throughout history. It must also account for 
the many and diverse ways narratives are shaped and spread, especially in the context of 
decolonizing academia and de-centering absolutist western epistemologies.   
 In addition to Alexander’s theory of cultural trauma, I will also be drawing on the 
concept of genealogy as conceived by Michel Foucault. Through his essays such as Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, and History, and Discipline and Punishment, Foucault draws upon Nietzschean 
perspectives on historical studies and methods to create his very own genealogical approach to 
create a ‘history of the present’, or the use of “history as a means of critical engagement with the 
present” (Garland, 2014, p. 368). Foucault went into detail on this topic during his 1976 lectures 
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at the Collège de France titled Society Must Be Defended.  He describes genealogy in his own 
terms, as “ a coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to 
constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that concept in contemporary 
tactics” (Foucault, p. 8). By studying both historical records of the comfort women situation, as 
well as working with South Korean individuals on the topic, I hope to channel this genealogical 
method in my own work and to carry out its intent “to problematize the present by revealing the 
power relations upon which it depends and the contingent processes that have brought it into 
being (Garland, p. 371). 
 
Historical Context 
Thanks to the work of historians and the many testimonial narratives of comfort women 
survivors, researchers have been able to better understand who these women were and are, and 
the experiences they were put through. Even though the Japanese had signed multiple 
international treaties in 1925 banning the traffic of women and girls, a provision allowed 
signatories not to apply the laws in their own colonies (Soh, 2008, p. 21). The term ‘comfort 
women’ was created as a euphemism by the Japanese government for the women forcefully 
mobilized into military sexual slavery. These women originated from diverse backgrounds – 
most from the Korean peninsula, as well as Chinese, Filipino, Taiwanese, and Dutch women 
among others (Kim, 2014). Due to Japan's colonial economic policy and class system, many 
young girls from jobless or landless families were made particularly vulnerable to forced 
mobilization (Min, 2003). By means of kidnapping, deceptive economic incentives, and 
volunteer opportunities, the Japanese military is estimated to have sexually exploited between 
20,000 to 400,000 young women (Soh, 2008).  Placed at ‘comfort stations’ around Japan’s span 
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of colonial rule, life for these women was miserable; characterized by beating, torture, and rape 
from as many as 30-40 Japanese soldiers per day (Lee, 2016).  
 For almost 50 years following the war, comfort women survivors had to live in prolonged 
suffering and silence - these women were essentially ‘othered’. The inability to vocalize their 
experiences and demand for justice was caused by an intersection of fundamental political, 
economic, social, and cultural power relations of the time (Soh, 2008). Prevalent were “strong 
patriarchal traditions and strong sexual double standards” (Min, 2003, p. 948)1, including the 
stigmatization of yullak yosong; ‘defiled’ and ‘ethically fallen’ women (Soh, 2008). Survivors 
who belonged to lower-class families lacked funds and political power to push for justice, and 
even those from middle- or upper- class backgrounds remained silenced by the stigmatization of 
sex workers.  Not only this, but the transitional politics of post-occupation South Korea 
contributed greatly to the reifying of the social stigmatization of sex labor in general. After the 
Korean War ended in 1953, hundreds of thousands of Korean women became involved in a state-
controlled (though eventually privatized) prostitution industry in towns known as kijich’on, or 
American military ‘camp towns’ (Soh, 2008) The South Korean government set surveillance and 
control measures over these women and their bodies, in order to please the U.S. soldiers’ sexual 
appetites. Through the eyes of the states, these women had the ‘honor’ of not only satisfying 
these appetites, but also of being “patriots designated and actively enlisted by their national 
government to help promote U.S.-R.O.K security alliances (Moon, 1998, p. 143).  However, the 
kijich’on women gained no respect for their work. From the viewpoint of the Korean National 
Assembly, South Korea’s unicameral legislature which was male-dominated from 1948-1989,  
the state-mandated sexual labor industry was “necessary and positive for national security and 
 
1 It is important to note that due to the lack of accessibility of information from North Korea, the term 'Korea' from 
this point onwards refers to the Republic of Korea (South Korea). 
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economic growth, respectively” (Soh, 2008, p. 224). They continued to be seen as defiled and 
soiled, reinforcing the gender and sex work stigmas even as kijich’on camps were seen as a part 
of essential foreign policy to foster national security and economic growth (Soh, 2008). Over the 
four decades of the American presence in Korean it is estimated that there were 250,000 to 
300,000 kijich’on prostitutes, and as of the mid ‘90s, ninety-six kijich’on communities were 
supported by about 27,000 American troops. Though contemporary media focuses on the 
atrocities Japan has committed upon Korean women, the fact that the Korean military created 
and operated its own comfort women system has received little public attention. Future 
researchers may be interested in studying to what extent this is known to the Korean public, and 
if and how it is taught. 
Given the predominance of “patriarchal customs emphasizing women's chastity, 
marriage, and childbearing/childrearing in Korea at that time", comfort women survivors faced 
extreme hardships; unable to stay in their parental homes because of the pressure to wed, higher 
rates of infertility and venereal diseases, and difficulty to survive economically (Min, 2003, p. 
949). These factors, in addition to the presence of kijich’on camps, made it so that it wasn’t until 
the early 1990s that the comfort women issue was brought into the public eye; when survivors 
came forward with their stories, aided by Korean feminist leaders (Min, 2003; Lee, 2016).  
 The first surviving comfort woman to bring her story to the public was Japanese advocate 
Mihara Yoshie (1921-1993), in a 1986 radio interview for TBS in Japan; more than five years 
before Kim Hak-Sun came forward in South Korea (Soh, 2008). Discussing her experiences, she 
expresses her frustration about the years of silence: 
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Not once, not one word! The deaths of numerous young women who served as ianfu2, or 
purveyors of sex, have never been consoled [mourned] in the forty years since the end of 
the war. I feel like saying [to my fellow Japanese], you idiots [bakayarō], really!” (p. 
197). 
Korean comfort women survivors eventually followed after the South Korean government’s 
transition to the Sixth Republic, a reformed and reconstituted government led by Roh Tae-Woo 
(노태우). Under the leadership of Roh, military power was extricated, and civilian supremacy 
reasserted (The Sixth Republic, n.d.). This included the development of the Democratic Liberal 
party, expansions of freedom of press, improved foreign relations, and recognition of university 
autonomy (Bedeski, 1994). Such reforms may have played a role in the emergence of Korean 
voices in the early 90’s, once the Sixth Republic was firmly set into place.  
 1990 marked the establishment of the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military 
Sexual Slavery by Japan (Korean council), a non-profit organization created to advocate for the 
rights of surviving comfort women, to call upon Japan to take responsibility and provide 
reparations, and to prevent wartime sexual violence (Korean Council, n.d.) One of the most 
notable activities of the Korean Council is known globally as the Wednesday Demonstration, a 
protest that has been held at noon each Wednesday in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul 
since January 8, 1992, when Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Seoul. Since then, 
the group has had almost 1,500 organized protests. However, in the early days of the protests 
before its popularity grew, activists were met with some hostility by the Korean public; lingering 
effects of the deeply engrained patriarchal values in Korean society. In a radio discussion on 
 
2 Ianfu means comfort women in Japanese, pronounced similarly to 의안부, the Korean term for comfort women. 
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KBS world radio in 2014, head of the Korean Council, Yun Mi-Hyang (윤미향) described the 
initial resistance; “even office workers scoffed at us for advertising the shameful past. So women 
would sometimes hide their faces behind the signs or sunglasses”(KBS World Radio, para. 11). 
The movement eventually gained popularity as members of the public started to join, and as 
more and more comfort women survivors came out and shared their stories. 29 years later, 
people from all over Korea, young and old, have come to show their support. Ms. Yun happily 
remarks on the Wednesday demonstrations’ growth: 
“Now the younger generation joins the old ladies to sing of peace and tell the ladies how 
proud they are for speaking out, bringing smiles to the ladies’ faces. Now the former 
comfort women don’t wear sunglasses or hide their faces behind signs. They think of 
themselves as peace advocates or human rights activists. They’re here as history teachers 
for future generations” ”(KBS World Radio, 2014, para. 13) 
The comfort women survivors’ memories soon spread transnationally; multiple monuments and 
memorials remembering these women have been constructed around the world in places such as 
the United States and Australia, highlighting the augmenting amount of international support for 
the women (Kim, 2014).  
Since then, there has been a consistent and strong demand for recompense for victims, the 
release of all documents and materials relating to the issue, and a sincere apology from the 
Japanese government, for which they have responded vaguely (ECOSOC, 1996, p. 21). In 1992, 
for example, at the beginning of the justice movement, Japanese Chief Secretary Kono “issued a 
vaguely worded statement admitting the country’s involvement in the comfort system but not its 
legal responsibility”, in response to damning archival documents published by historian Yoshimi 
the year before (Jun, 2019). Shortly thereafter, resolutions calling for a formal apology were 
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passed by various nation-states and international organizations such as the United States (2007 
H. Res. 121), the European Parliament (P6_TA(2007)0632), and the United Nations (UN) passed 
resolutions calling for an apology. In 1996, the UN published findings of the Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy from her 
mission to the Korean peninsula and Japan to observe, analyze, and report on the issue of 
wartime sexual slavery. In this report, the arguments of defense from the government of Japan 
are well articulated; that “the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and other instruments of 
international law did not exist during the period of the Second World War and, therefore, the 
Government is not responsible for violating international humanitarian law” (UNHRC, 1996, p. 
23). The Japanese government also “takes the firm stand that all claims have been settled under 
bilateral treaties”, such as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, “and that Japan is not legally bound to 
pay compensation to individual victims” (UNHRC, 1996, p. 24). However, after close analysis of 
international policy, these arguments are proven invalid.  Ms. Coomaraswamy’s conclusive 
findings are expressed succinctly: 
"The special rapporteur is absolutely convinced that most of the women kept at comfort 
stations were taken against their will, that the Japanese Imperial Army initiated, 
regulated, and controlled the vast network of comfort stations, and that the Government 
of Japan is responsible for the comfort stations. In addition, the Government of Japan 
should be prepared to assume responsibility for what this implies under international law" 
(UNHRC, 1996, p. 22). 
The most recent official attempt of reconciliation from the Japanese government took 
place in late 2015 when Prime Minister Abe expressed his "most sincere apologies and remorse", 
granting comfort women survivors $8.3 million for compensation and care (Jun, 2019). In their 
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official report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) states that this agreement 
“confirms that this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly”, and that the South Korean and 
Japanese governments will “refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in 
the international community, including at the United Nations” (MOFA, 2015, para. 4). The 
Korean public and many civil society organizations such as the Korean Council deemed this 
agreement insufficient due to its indirect and vague apology and the fact that comfort women 
survivors nor their supporters had been involved in the creation of the agreement (Jun, 2019; 
Ward, 2016). Shortly after his administration was established, South Korean President Moon-
Jae-In (문재인) commented on the 2015 agreement, saying that “the reality is the majority of our 
people cannot emotionally accept the comfort women agreement”. Human rights experts at the 
UN stated reflected such worries, that the agreement “falls short of meeting the demands of 
survivors” (OHCHR, 2016, para. 6).  It was highly recommended that Japan implement the 
recommendations made by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and revise the original agreement, changes including the recognition of the right of 
survivors to take part in remedy discourse, to provide further compensation and rehabilitative 
services, and to create an "unequivocal official apology recognizing full responsibility" 
(OHCHR, 2016, para 14). Since the 2015 agreement, tensions between the two nations have 
remained high. In addition to the comfort women situation, tensions between South Korea and 
Japan have also been heightened due to the ongoing Japanese-South Korea Liancourt Rocks3 
dispute and the trade that began around 2019, which many perceive to be partly a manifestation 
 
3 The Liancourt Rocks  are a small group of islets in the Sea of Japan, known as Dokdo (독도) in Korean and 
Takeshima (竹島) in Japanese, whose ownership has long been disputed.  
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of historical grievances caused by the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula (Maizland, 
2019).  
Relations between the two nations recently experienced a development on January 8th, 
2021, when a Korean court ruled that the Japanese government should compensate 12 out of the 
16 remaining comfort women survivors registered with the Korean government 100 million won 
($91,000) each (Choe, 2021). In a surprising reverse of their position following the 2015 
agreement, the Korean Ministry of Affairs (still under the Moon Jae-In administration) 
responded to the court ruling, saying "we respect the court's judgement", while also noting that 
"the comfort women agreement in December 2015 was an official agreement between the two 
governments", and should be followed through by both parties (HanKook Ilbo, 2021). Public 
opinion of the sudden renewal of the agreement has yet to be gauged and it has yet to be 
determined such a renewal actually will take place. Leif-Eric Easly, professor of international 
studies at Ewha Women's University commented that this ruling may actually worsen Korean-
Japanese relations. He expects that Japan will deem the ruling “an escalation in a pattern of 
weaponizing history and breaking international agreements” (Choe, 2021). This is extremely 
important to watch in the upcoming months, may have a large impact on the results of my study.  
All of these factors combined the call for Japan to take responsibility for its actions is 
louder than ever. Many fear that in the near future, the Japanese government will dismiss the 
issue entirely, as there are fewer and fewer living comfort women survivors, and the women will 
not get the justice that they deserve.  
 
Contemporary Discussion 
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 Though there have not been many studies conducted that have focused on the comfort 
women problem's effects on the attitudes of the Korean public, the few that have been conducted 
provide glimpses into just how strong the transmission and diffusion of the trauma can be. It is 
clear that trauma has been passed through the survivors directly; a 2019 study conducted by 
multiple Korean universities assessed and interviewed direct descendants of comfort women 
survivors to assess the transgenerational transmission of trauma. These participants showed 
similar hyperarousal symptoms to their mothers when exposed to stimuli associated with comfort 
women. Additionally, almost all participants suffered from at least one psychiatric disorder such 
as major depressive disorder, panic disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder among others; 
telling signs of trauma transmission (Lee, 2019).  Another study also demonstrates how trauma 
affects not only direct descendants of survivors, but also affects a national identity and culture as 
a whole. In a 2019 study led by Hana Jun of Indiana University, Korean primary school students 
were assessed on their affective historical empathy and national identity based on their 
understanding of comfort women. It was found that these children found strong personal and 
emotional connections with comfort women as “Koreans”; one of the most notable quotes from 
one child saying, “I think the comfort women are us” (Jun, 2019, p. 16). During the interviews, 
the children referred to these women as “our nation’s grandmothers” suffering from what “’we’ 
and ‘they’” did as nations, and also identified “themselves as future citizens of their nation” (p. 
17). From observing these students, it is clear that the history and experiences of the 'comfort 
women' have become strongly engrained into Korean national identity. In her research 
publication, Jun importantly notes that it must be studied how these children came to develop 
such strong feelings of connection, whether from family narrative, school curricula, Korean 
media outlets, and more. The findings from these studies are incredibly important to my research 
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and the discourse of comfort women, in that they demonstrate that "the repercussion of the 
comfort women trauma is not confined to the victims themselves, and it would not be over even 
inf all the remaining survivors pass away" (Lee, 2019, p. 253).   
 
Research Design and Methods 
To answer my research question, I have conducted exploratory and applied research 
using mostly primary research and using secondary research as a foundation for my work and 
analysis, as summarized in the literature review above. This research is exploratory in that there 
are few existing frameworks and theories surrounding the cultural trauma of comfort women. I 
aimed to identify its impacts and predictive power. It is applied in that its findings may 
contribute to future discussions and agreements between the Korean government, activists, 
survivors, and the Japanese government. 
Having solicited IRB approval through Seattle University, starting in early April I began 
to recruit participants for a survey; 5-10 young Korean adults of all genders residing in Seoul and 
Busan, the two highest-populated cities in the country. Ideally, I would have interacted with 
those in rural areas as well, but due to time and accessibility constraints, I have focused on urban 
areas where the public voice is more condensed. The selected participants are direct descendants 
of comfort women survivors, as such research has already been conducted and has demonstrated 
the transmission of trauma in this population (Lee, 2019). My participant age group consisted of 
those 18-25 years old, international age (not Korean age)4. To select and contact participants, I 
used the connections I have with young men and women in Seoul and Busan, who have already 
 
4 In this system known as lunar age or East Asian age reckoning, system people are born at the age of one,  and age 
one year add the beginning of the Lunar year (or the Gregorian calendar year, common in South Korea), rather than 
their anniversary of birth. It is common for someone’s age to be one to two years older than in the international age 
system.  
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consented and willed their efforts. I requested that they seek out others who may be interested in 
participating as well, ideally reaching a more diverse sample in terms of socioeconomic status, 
education level, etc. I am aware that this selection method may have limited my research and 
introduced selection bias; in that my ability to randomize participants is very limited, and that 
they may only be from certain social groups and may not reflect the entire target population. 
 After contact and completion of consent forms, each participant was sent a survey about 
their background and experiences with the narrative of comfort women. The survey questions 
were presented in both English and Korean, and participants had the choice of responding in the 
language of their choice. I used two particular platforms to communicate with participants; 
Kakaotalk and Google. Kakaotalk is the main application used in South Korea for texting, 
calling, and video chatting, so it provides the most accessibility for connections and 
communications outside of the survey themselves. Consent forms were sent and received by 
email, and the survey was conducted using Google Forms.  
When translating these questions to ask in the surveys and focus groups, I worked closely 
with native Korean speakers to make sure that the language is as neutral, clear, and professional 
as possible. During the process of translating and analyzing survey responses, a Korean-English 
speaker was present in order to ensure clear communication with participant and assist with the 
interpretation and accuracy of statements and ideas that are outside my Korean language 
abilities. All information collected is confidential. I have collected direct identifiers of the 
participants (name of participant, age, and location), but I will not use this information in any 
written report or oral presentation. After the study, I will erase all identifiers from my interview 
notes. There was no sensitive information collected; and participants were fully aware that they 
were under no obligation to answer all questions.   
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Researching with a Feminist framework, I prioritized the use of topic guidelines rather 
than narrowly defined questions to identify and evaluate nuances of social phenomena and 
gender relations (Beetham, 2007).  Taking an intersectional approach, I framed my questions and 
direct conversation under the knowledge that “colonization, gender, and class were inseparably 
toed together to make the lives of Korean comfort women extremely miserable” (Min, 940). In 
the survey, I asked questions related to how the history of comfort women was portrayed by the 
government, media, schools, and families and how it has been carried with them, their 
experience with their gender and such history, their perspective of the Japanese government and 
if, when, how, and why it has changed. Additionally, I asked participants to gauge their 
perceived importance of the issue, currently and looking towards the future. The questions as 
they appear in the survey can be found in Appendix A.  
I analyzed participants’ responses and searched for trends and indicators in their answers 
(such as political participation, education, and views on gender relations) as it relates to the 
transmission of trauma and formation of national identity, to determine to what extent has the 
comfort women situation become intertwined with the individual and the group. I examined the 
use and tone of language in responses, and if their linguistic choice indicates a sense of “us” and 
“them”, as well as other patterns that I may not foresee. I applied my findings to Alexander’s 
theory of cultural trauma, examining the ways in which the participant’s sentiments towards and 
narratives of comfort women demonstrate the presence of cultural trauma and the criteria needed 
for an effective narrative. Collected responses were used to synthesize a potentially shared 
perspective of young Korean adults on the comfort women issue, how and if it translates to an 
effect on their sense of national identity and their attitudes towards Japan. 
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Evidence and Analysis 
Evidently in all of the participant’s responses, a consistent narrative of the comfort 
women’s experiences was present. According to participants, each first learned about the comfort 
women issue around the age of 13, through lessons and government-issued textbooks at school 
as well as through the media (internet news, tv broadcasts, and movies). A narrative focusing on 
national identity dominated their study collective narrative and language used by the participants 
makes distinct Alexander’s 5 criteria for an effective narrative of cultural trauma. When 
examining narrative, one must examine the nature of the pain, the nature of the victim, the 
relation of the trauma victim to the wider audience, and the attribution of responsibility 
(Alexander, p. 13-15).  
The first (1) criterion, stating the nature of the pain, was consistent in all responses. When 
asked to describe the history and experiences of comfort women, all participants showed a 
thorough and accurate understanding of the nature of Japan’s military sexual slavery system, 
including not only forced recruitment, but also voluntary recruitment under the guise of an 
employment opportunity. Participant’s emphasized the physical and emotional violence inflicted 
upon the comfort women, describing it using terms repeatedly such as “inhuman” and “cruel”, 
among others.  Some participants included the silence of comfort women survivors after the 
colonial era, noting the role of deeply embedded patriarchal roles and values in Korean society. 
However, no respondents mentioned the impact of kijich’on camps, and the presence of a South 
Korean state-mandated prostitution industry. Because respondents participated in an online 
survey, I was unable to ask follow-up questions regarding their awareness of this part of Korean 
history. It appears that this history has been kept outside of the narrative, in that though it is an 
KOREAN “COMFORT WOMEN” Adamek 23 
important part of gender relations in South Korea, it may hinder its effectiveness as a tool of 
fostering a sense Korean solidarity and community around the comfort women issue.  
Participants showed no variation when identifying the perpetrator (2), of the comfort 
women system as Japan, specifically the Japanese government. The majority of participants 
made sure to make this distinction clear; often using the term ‘Japanese government’ instead of 
merely ‘Japan’ to avoid any risk of generalization. “Koreans generally have anti-Japanese 
sentiment. So do I”, a participant stated, “but I don’t think it’s right to hate or despise the entire 
Japanese people”. Nonetheless, the use of “us” vs “them” was present throughout all responses, 
consistent with the similar findings in Jun’s study of primary Korean school students (Jun, 2019). 
In their response to a question regarding their view of Japan’s past reparational efforts, one 
participant explained that, “We don’t want monetary things, we don’t want huge rewards. We 
just need them to truly understand our hearts and give a true apology about trampling out lives”. 
This language demonstrates that in relation to the comfort women issue, the Korean public in 
addition to comfort women survivors feels directly victimized and deserving of proper amends 
by the Japanese government.  
 In addition to a clear identification of the perpetrator, all participants identified the 
victims (3) as Koreans, not only referring to the comfort women themselves but the people of 
Korea in general. Participants did not, however, acknowledge the multiple and diverse origins of 
comfort women (Taiwan, Philippines, etc.). This reflects yet another finding found in Jun’s 
study. Though Jun’s participants were aware that there were non-Korean comfort women, when 
asked to select photos to explain comfort women in a mock international conference, none 
decided to use the photo of a Dutch comfort women survivor. This decision, described by one 
participant, was made in order to “focus on our national victims. The reason we do this now is to 
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provide an apology and reflection to our national victims first, and then, to others…” (p. 12). In 
addition, participants indicate any active interest in learning more about non-Korean comfort 
women.  
The omission of kijich’on camps as well as comfort women of other nationalities in 
participants’ narratives solidifies the victim and perpetrators identity; popular narratives 
including such parts of history may not have been as effective due to the ambiguity of these 
identities; the victims being women all over East Asia and the Pacific Islands, the perpetrators 
being the Korean government and the American military in addition to the Japanese government. 
The demand for justice would be exponentially more complex and difficult if recompense is 
demanded from multiple nations, including Korea itself. The multiplicity and ambiguity of the 
perpetrator’s identity it would also make it harder to form an understanding of ‘us vs them’, 
critical in narratives of cultural trauma.  In addition, such a narrative would not play as strong of 
a role in the formation of national identity, if comfort women of other nationalities were to be 
included. The omission of these many women from the mainstream South Korean narrative 
frames the comfort women issue as a national and ethnic issue; making it easier for Koreans to 
identify with victims and to share in their pain while forming a sense of solidarity and opposition 
towards the Japanese government. Some participants’ briefly mentioned the “other issues not yet 
resolved between Japan and South Korea”, alluding to things such as the trade dispute and 
disagreements on the handling of North Korea. One participant noted, that as a Korean citizen, “I 
feel like I’m not being respected”   
All participants demonstrated that the narrative of the comfort women plays a solidifying 
role in their identity of South Korean citizens, and that it is a national issue founded upon 
irreversible harm. However, there was a significant disconnect between the men’s and women’s 
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responses regarding their personal experiences with the comfort women history, and their ability 
to identity with the victims (4). Gender identity played a significant role in the connection 
between the respondents and comfort women survivors. In questions throughout the survey, 
female participants expressed stronger sentiments and a higher sense of importance towards than 
male participants. When asked about her relationship to the comfort women victims, a female 
participant stated that, “I am heartbroken. Maybe if I were born in those days, it would have 
happened to me too”. In response to a later question, the participant explained that “I understand 
the pain of the comfort women as a woman”. Another woman participant noted “how women can 
be treated with insult for a long time in a sexual way”. The ability to relate to the dangers and 
oppression that women during the Japanese occupation faced and those that women in Korea 
today have to face is instrumental in the development and effectiveness of empathy. This may 
foster a more accurate and intense understanding of pain and struggle the comfort women had to 
face than male respondents, who, on the broad basis of gender identity, would not be able to the 
same degree. This fact was acknowledged by one of the male participants, where he stated that “I 
can’t sympathize with everyone, but I feel a lot of sadness and respect [for the comfort women]”.  
Both male and female participants identified the comfort woman issue as one of great 
importance. However, tonal differences indicate a higher perception of importance among 
women than men. “It’s a part of [Korean] history”, a female participant noted, ”and there are so 
many things that haven’t been fully resolved yet”. Another stated that the history of the comfort 
women is “an indelible pain and [source of] anger for the people of Korea”. However, a male 
participant described the comfort women issue as “a problem that even Koreans are not 
interested in very deeply”. It appears that gender identity has an effect on not only the 
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relationship to victims, but also on participants gauge of the comfort women issue as a social and 
political issue. 
Finally, responses indicated a common proposed solution (5) to the comfort women issue. 
Responses from all 8 participants confirmed that the young generation views Japan’s past 
attempts for reconciliation inadequate, and that a proper apology is most called for. Respondents  
described these past attempts as “insincere” and “shameless”, one participant explaining that 
even after a past apology, “there is always absurd remarks or abusive language that reverses it. 
Eventually it comes down to feeling like they are joking”. In response to the monetary 
reparations that Japan has made, the shared sentiment between participants was that “”special” or 
“financial compensation can never be accepted as an apology”. Rather, participants demand 
something that is “not material”. They ask for a “true apology”, one that is “more sincere”. 
The narrative of the comfort women, as told by the young Korean adults that participated 
in this study, meets all of Alexanders criteria for an effective narrative to house and to carry 
cultural trauma. However. The ability of female respondents to identify more strongly with 
comfort women victims suggests that cultural trauma is more or solely present among young 
Korean women. Cultural trauma may still be present among young Korean men, though to a 
lesser extent. National identity may be a stronger driving force of the interest and participation of 
men in the comfort women history and movement.  
 
Conclusion 
The results of my study have confirmed my thesis that the trauma of the comfort women 
is not isolated to the victims themselves, nor solely their descendants; that it resonates and has 
become intertwined with the much of the Korean public through cultural trauma, particularly 
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with young Korean women. Participant’s responses have illuminated a clear narrative through 
which comfort women history is told; meeting Alexanders’ five requirements for an effective 
narrative in spreading national identity and cultural trauma. The completion of these criteria was 
done by the omission of various historical factors and events, such as the presence of kijich’on 
camps and the diverse national backgrounds of comfort women in the wider military sexual 
slavery system, in order to create a clearer sense of perpetrator, victim, and the traumatic event 
itself.  Though the narrative of the comfort women plays a large role in creating a sense of 
national identity for both Korean men and women, it appears that the transmission of cultural 
trauma is limited to the women, due to their ability as women to more closely relate to the 
identities and gendered experiences of comfort women victims. This result calls for the further 
study of the relationship between gender identity and cultural trauma. 
Ideally, this study would have had a greater number of participants from all over Korea, 
including rural areas to prevent selection bias and to better reflect the South Korean narrative  of 
the comfort women history. This study would also be improved by adding opportunity for 
follow-up questions from the researcher to the participants, whether through survey or interview 
form, to explore areas of nuance and to ask questions that the researcher was unable to predict 
before publishing the initial survey.  
These conclusions can be used and applied to future conversations and agreement-
making between the two nations, giving the negotiating parties a better sense of the lasting 
effects of the comfort women situation, as well as the ability to provide a more precise, truthful, 
and holistic agreement. Reconciliation of such atrocities must involve "self-reflexivity, 
acknowledgment, redistributive justice, corrective mechanisms, and a final movement of 
forgiving"; and of these, I aim to contribute to acknowledgment and redistributive justice (Kim, 
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2014). Additionally, this study can also be used as an indicator to better predict South Korean-
Japanese relations. The participants, being young adults have or are finishing their education, are 
entering the workforce, and have the ability to fully engage in societal and political affairs. They 
are an emerging and influential population that will be key in the future relations between the 
two countries as it relates to comfort women. Participants’ responses have indicated political 
relations between Japan and South Korea will remain tense for the foreseeable future, and that 
the nations may experience more gridlock in creating an agreement of reparations that the South 
Korean government and public will accept.  Moreover, I hope my research will aid in motivating 
an appropriate response from Japan, for “the act of remembering affirms a society’s positive 
identity in the world of globalizing memory and human rights discourse” (Kim, 2014). Lastly, I 
hope to positively contribute to such discourse, as well as discussions around the transmission of 
memories, and reconciliation. I hope to provide an example or framework for those studying 
narratives of cultural trauma and national identity, and those fighting for the justice of those 
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 Google Forms Anonymous Survey Questions 
 
Please answer each question below as thoroughly as possible based on your experience with the 
‘comfort women’ history. You may skip any question on this survey and may request to be 
removed from this study at any time.  
 
1. What is your age? (International Age) 
___ (Fill in) 
 
2. What is your gender identification? 




__Prefer to self-describe, below 
  _____(Fill in) 
__Prefer not to say 
 
 
3. In your own words, describe the ‘comfort women’ and their experiences during the 
Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula.  
_____ (Fill in) 
 
4. How old were you when you first learned about the ‘comfort women’ history? 
_____ (Fill in) 
 
5. Through what channels did you learn about the ‘comfort women’? For example, school 
textbooks, news broadcasts, interpersonal dialogue, etc.). 
_____ (Fill in) 
 5.a For each applicable: what messages did you feel were trying to be 
communicated to you? 
_____ (Fill in) 
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6. What terms do you commonly refer to the women as? (e.g., ‘comfort women’, ‘sexual 
slavery victims’, etc. What do others use? 
_____ ( Fill in) 
 
7. When you think about the ‘comfort women’ and what they went through, what kind of 
thoughts come to mind?  
_____ (Fill in) 
 
8. In what ways if any do you believe the ‘comfort women’ history has impacted your: 
I. Outlook on life 
II. Gender experience  
III. Identity as a South Korean citizen   
_____ (Fill in for each) 
 
9.  How would you describe the current political relationship between South Korea and 
Japan in general? 
_____ (Fill in) 
a. In relation to the comfort women issue?  
_____ (Fill in) 
 
10. Has learning about and discussing the ‘comfort women’ effected your view of the 
Japanese government? 
_____ (Fill in) 
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11. Do you feel Japan has offered adequate reparations to the comfort women survivors? If 
so, why, and if not, what do you think should be done? 
_____ (Fill in) 
 
12. Have you participated in ‘comfort women’ activism? (e.g. Wednesday protests, sharing 
news online, donating to organizations, etc.)  
 
13. Do you think the comfort women issue is important? Will it be important in the future? 
Why or why not?  
_____ (Fill in) 
 
14. Is there anything else you’d like to mention? 
_____ (Fill in) 
 
 
 
 
 
